The constitution of South Africa is based on equality and ensuring that every person including those who have acted in breach of it are treated fairly. The right to a speedy trial is supported by section 35(3)(d) of the Constitution, which states that “Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right, to have their trial begin without unreasonable delay”

Due to the nature of litigious matters, some cases are often postponed for various reasons. An example of this would be a matter being postponed for the accused to get legal representation or for a matter being postponed for further investigations. When determining whether an accused right to a speedy trial is affected, we have to consider the reasons for the postponement and whether the accused would be prejudiced by such a postponement.

It is the responsibility of the attorney representing the accused to object to postponements that infringe on the rights of their client. In premises of this, the court holds the final decision to grant or refuse a postponement.

When discussing the infringement of the accused’s right to a speedy trial we have to make a distinction between pre-conviction and post-conviction delay prejudice.

The constitutional court in S v Dzukuda 2000 (4) SA 1078 (CC) discussed the issue of pre-conviction delay. The court stated that trial interest, liberty, and security were interests that had to be protected in pre-conviction delay. This means that trial-related prejudice had to be considered when postponing the matter serval times. An example of trial-related prejudice is witnesses being unavailable to attend court and subsequently having fading memories as significant time has lapsed. In terms of Liberty and security, the court stated that when a matter is postponed numerous times the final judgment is delayed. Because of this the accused is subjected to stigmatization of having committed the crime by members of society, despite being presumed innocent until proven guilty.

The court in the S v Boeksak 2001 (1) SA 912 (CC) discussed post-conviction delay. It stated that an accused is not severely prejudiced by a post-conviction postponement in comparison to a pre-conviction postponement.

In conclusion, it is the responsibility of the accused’s attorney to ensure that the rights of the accused are protected and that they are treated fairly and not unduly prejudiced by the State.